

SECRET

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
Problem:

SecDef has directed that allied capability be fully taken into account in assessing the adequacy of programmed U.S. forces to meet potential threats. To be responsive to this directive the U.S. defense planning and analysis community requires estimates of allied military capability at least comparable in accuracy to estimates of the threat. At present such estimates are not routinely made.

Substantive Objective:

To provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments of the current and future military and political capabilities of existing and potential U.S. allies to contribute to a common defense against Soviet or PRC expansionism.

25X6



OSD DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

Mr. Gene Porter
X73746

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Second Substantive Objective

Soviet Strategic Objectives

Insert after question 6

What are Soviet policies, deployment plans and capabilities with respect to limited nuclear options?

We are currently implementing modifications to our targeting doctrine based on the realization that massive retaliation against Soviet cities, in response to anything less than an all-out attack on the U.S. and its cities, would be an unreasonable response and may not be credible enough to deter the Soviet Union from attacking U.S. military targets in a crisis. The extent of these modifications and the attendant modifications to our strategic offensive forces will, in a large part, be driven by Soviet perceptions of the viability of limited nuclear option scenarios.

ICIR Richard A. Gregg
695-5587

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Following question #13. Soviet Frontal Aviation

These KIQs have a very strong strategic and political orientation. In view of the increased national emphasis on conventional capability the KIQs need to address Soviet conventional capabilities also.

What are the types, sizes, capabilities and inventories of the Soviet Warsaw pact conventional air delivered munitions?

There is a dearth of information on Soviet air-delivered munitions. A special effort is desired to determine what advances the Soviets are making in air-delivered conventional munitions. It seems inconceivable that they have not done any development work on these munitions after experiencing the variety of weapons we used in VietNam.

Mr. Speir X79141

What are the intended, size, role, and armament of the Fitter, Flogger and Fencer force?

The Soviets appear to be engaged in a major upgrading of their tactical air force with these airplanes. It is important to have a good assessment of these aircraft so that we can properly assess the threat to our own forces.

L/C Fitts X79141

What progress have the Soviets made in development of tactical air-launched standoff weapons?

These weapons are likely to represent a significant escalation in the threat. It is important that we understand the Soviet progress in this area.

L/C Fitts X79141

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Second Substantive Objective

Between 14 and 15:

"how will construction of new submarines be affected by allocation of Soviet shipyard capacity to overhaul and maintenance of SSBNs and other submarines already completed or currently under construction?"

The uncertainty in the intelligence projections of Soviet nuclear submarine forces is primarily associated with the question of how they will use their nuclear shipyard capabilities as they approach or reach SALT limitations on strategic submarine force levels.

Information on Soviet SSBN (and SSN) overhaul cycles, numbers of submarines in overhaul or maintenance and duration in that status, and estimated building capacity given estimated overhaul/maintenance workload, would be of particular value.

Appropriate information is not currently available.

Mr. Gene H. Porter
X73746

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Before question #19. Soviet Air and Missile Defenses

The heading as presently stated emphasizes strategic air defense to the exclusion of tactical air defense, yet the pressing need (in terms of number of aircraft likely to be exposed) is to understand tactical air defenses.

What are the Soviet objectives in air defense technology?

At present new air defense weapons appear apparently on an ad hoc basis. We need to understand what the Soviet goals are.

Ms. Cutchis X52606

Between questions #19 and #20. What major Soviet technological advancements might be expected in the area of surface-to-air defenses?

In order to retain our capability in the face of Soviet air defense progress we need to know what technologies they are likely to be using.

Ms. Cutchis X52606

Question 21. What progress are the Soviets making toward air and missile defense applications of lasers and beam weapons?

This rewrite removes the strategic defense emphasis and directs the search toward tactical applications also.

Ms. Cutchis X52606

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Third Substantive Objective

China: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy

Question 31

Delete. See remarks under question 33.

L. Rylander, x-70584

Third Substantive Objective

China: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy

Question 33:

"What are Peking's objectives and intentions and what major trends are likely with regard to the following:

- a) Attaining superpower status or competing with the U.S. and/or the USSR in the superpower arena.
- b) The role of the U.S. and USSR in Asia.
- c) Leadership of the Third World.
- d) Support of revolutionary movements in the less developed countries.

Also of interest is the way in which events in one of these areas affect Peking's actions and perceptions in the others."

This revision synthesizes the previous questions 31 and 33. The advantage is that it more clearly defines the areas of foreign affairs in which China is currently or potentially active, and allows a broader treatment of the interactions among those areas.

L. Rylander, x-70584

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Third Substantive Objective

Chinese Military Capabilities

Insert Between Questions 34 and 35

"What are the limits on PRC development and production of military systems due to technological limits, availability of scientifically educated manpower for research and development, and availability of skilled labor, material, and physical plant for production?"

The potential limitations addressed in this question are the keys to future Chinese capabilities. As a result, the question covers the way in which present capabilities (question 34) could be transformed into a future threat (question 35).

L. Rylander, x-70584

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Third Substantive Objective.

China: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy

Insert after Question 33

"What is Peking's attitude toward control of Taiwan? What methods (political or military) do they envision using to exert such control, and what time frame do they view as acceptable? What reaction do the Chinese expect from the U.S. on this issue, and how would a U.S. failure to react in the expected manner affect Sino-U.S. relations?

Include factors which affect China's military capability to conduct an invasion of Taiwan."

The future of Taiwan is one of the key issues in Sino-U.S. relations, and needs to be specifically addressed!

L. Rylander, x-70584

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Fourth Substantive Objective

Southeast Asia

Question 40

"What are Communist intentions and capabilities in Indochina and Thailand? Specifically:

a) In light of the Communist takeovers in Cambodia and South Vietnam, what sort of relationship does Hanoi seek with Laos and Cambodia? How do the North Vietnamese plan to govern South Vietnam?

b) To what extent will the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia encourage the resumption or expansion of Communist activity in Laos and Thailand? North Vietnamese support of this activity?"

This revision takes cognizance of the fundamentally altered situation in Southeast Asia.

L. Rylander, x-70524

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Fourth Substantive Objective

Southeast Asia

Insert Between Questions 40 and 41

"Have the Communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia altered Russian and Chinese interests and relative strengths in Southeast Asia? Are the Russians or Chinese willing to support renewed or intensified Communist activity in Laos or Thailand?"

This question addresses the fundamentally changed situation in Southeast Asia and distinguishes the role of the supporting Communist nations from the direct participants. Formerly, questions regarding both were contained in question 40.

Specific information needed includes indications of delivery of arms and ammunition, training and other forms of support for military activity.

L. Rylander, x-70584

Fourth Substantive Objective

Southeast Asia

Question 41

"Will remaining non-Communist elements . . . ?"

Change is editorial.

L. Rylander, x-70584

Fourth Substantive Objective

Southeast Asia

Insert After Question 41

"What impact have events in Indochina had on the perceptions of other nations of the role of the U.S. in the world? If possible, distinguish between general public and governmental views. What concrete steps have been taken as a result of any reassessment of the U.S. role?

Include, in particular, other Southeast Asian countries, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Israel and NATO countries."

This question addresses the possibility that contentions of U.S. abandonment of the nations in Indochina may have an impact on U.S. relations with other nations. An assessment of this possibility is crucial given the potential for a significant restructuring of our security arrangements with other countries.

L. Rylander, x-73984

Fifth Substantive Objective

Major Oil Exporters' Activities

Insert as Part of Question 59

"Include comprehensive estimates of new petroleum production through 1985."

The information requested would improve our ability to assess the relative power of OPEC in future years as well as the likely supply situation.

D. Shilling, x-57835